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SUMMARY
Carbon and graphite fibers are known to be electrically conductive. That property
has resulted in damage to electrical equipment from the inadvertent release of virgin fi-
bers into the atmosphere. The rapidly accelerating use of carbon fibers as the reinforce-
ment in filamentary composite materials brought up the possibility of accidental release
of carbon fibers from the burning of crashed commercial airliners with carbon composite
parts. Such release could conceivably cause widespread damage to electrical and electron-
ic equipment. This paper presents the experimental and analytical results of a compre-
hensive investigation by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the various
elements necessary to assess the extent of such potential damage in terms of annual ex-
pected costs and maximum losses at low probabilities of occurrence. A review of a NASA
materials research program to provide alternate or modified composite materials to over-
come any electrical hazards from the use of carbon composites in aircraft structures is
described.
INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been deeply committed
to the research and development of advanced composites for aerospace applications for more
than a dozen years. During the initial years of that research, the NASA followed an ev-
olutionary, rather than revolutionary, approach toward the use of composites on civilian
aircraft. Concurrent with several technology programs, NASA-sponsored flight service
programs involved the selective reinforcement of conventional metallic structures (i).
The modification of the tail cone of a CH-54 helicopter with stringers reinforced with
strips of unidirectional boron/epoxy composites served to increase the vertical bending
stiffness of the tail cone, while the addition of similar boron/epoxy reinforced stringers
and wing planks to the center wing boxes of two C-130 transport airplanes served to re-
duce the stress levels and increase the fatigue life of the wing boxes. Both modifications
were achieved at significant weight savings compared to the comparable metallic fixes.
Following an Air Force/NASA Long Range Planning Study for Composites (RECAST) in 1972
(2), several flight service programs which met the principal objectives of RECAST, to build
confidence in the use of composites in aircraft and to point the way to lower costs, were
begun. Several Kevlar/epoxy fairings were chosen for flight service evaluation on a num-
ber of commercial L-1011 transport aircraft, while aft pylon skins of boron fiber and
aluminum were put into service on three DC-10 aircraft to replace production titanium
skins. Two flight service programs involving secondary aircraft parts built of carbon/
epoxy composites have successfully demonstrated the long term service capability of com-
posite parts. Spoilers with carbon/epoxy skins have flown a cumulative total of more
than 1½ million hours in active service on Boeing 737 airliners. DC-10 upper aft rudders
built principally of carbon/epoxy materials have also been flown without any major prob-
lems in commercial airline service.
In 1975, NASA began a program to accelerate the development of several technologies
for improving substantially the fuel efficiency of commercial air transports. A vital
part of that Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) effort (3) is the composite structures de-
velopment program. That composite program involves the development, under NASA contracts,
of six aircraft components (Figure i) by three major transport manufacturers, Boeing,
Douglas, and Lockheed. Carbon fibers are the principal, though not sole, reinforcement
material to be used in those composites. This follows the emergence from the early tech-
nology and flight service programs of carbon (also referred to in this paper as "graphite")
fibers as the filamentary reinforcing material of choice for aircraft composite parts by
reason of a combination of desired properties together with low cost, high production,
and weight savings potentials.
NASA's accelerated efforts to promote the use of composites as a way to fuel-efficient
commercial air transports have been matched not only by the progress achieved in utiliza-
tion of carbon composites in new U. S. military aircraft, but also by independent programs
by major U. S. airframe manufacturers designed to use advanced composites to save weight
in their present and future airplanes (4). The concomitant emergence of carbon fibers
as a useful material for other industrial production uses, such as in sporting goods man-
ufacture, has led to the realization that this is a material destined for multi-million
kilogram quantities within the next decade (Figure 2).
A possible barrier to the optimistic future for carbon fibers appeared with the re-
port (5) that there was an uncertain risk associated with the widespread use of carbon
fibers due to their good electrical conductivity. Since they are extremely fine (about
8 microns in diameter) and lightweight (about 1.7 grams per cm 3) , they can be transported
by the wind for great distances. In contact with electrical devices, they could create
a number of adverse electrical effects, including resistive loading, short circuits, and
arcing, which could lead to electrical outages or destruction (Table I) (6). Several ac-
tual such incidents gave credence to the potential for damage. Several crashes involving
U. S. military aircraft with composite parts built of nonconductive boron fibers demon-
strated (Figure 3) the likelihood that similar crash and subsequent fire events involving
aircraft with carbon fiber composites might release free carbon fibers into the atmosphere
after the restraining influence of the resin matrix was removed from the composites
through oxidation by the fire. Furthermore, carbon fiber manufacturers and processors
have been aware for some time of the electrical problems which could occur from the in-
advertent release of carbon fibers during industrial operations, though they soon learned
to include simple, yet necessary, preventative steps in their normal manufacturing pro-
cedures (7).
The United States Government has an extensive interest in the widespread use of car-
bon/graphite composite materials and any potential hazards resulting from their use. A
number of recent programs have accelerated that interest. Some examples are: NASA's ACEE
program to expand the use of composites in civil aviation, federal procurement require-
ments for lightweight composite materials in high performance military aircraft, and fed-
eral automotive fuel consumption standards which require weight reductions that may be
met only by the significant utilization of composites. Consequently, the importance of
those programs contributed to a decision to conduct a government-wide program to study
and quantify any risks which would result from the widespread usage of carbon fibers.
The United States Federal Action Plan to deal with potential carbon fiber problems
was begun in early 1978 (8). The overall program, which was coordinated by the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), involved about ten government departments and agen-
cies shown in Figure 4. Although NASA was to assist other departments in several ways,
its main responsibility was to conduct a thorough assessment of the risks of electrical
and electronic damage that might result by the inadvertent release of conductive carbon
fibers from crashes of civilian aircraft with carbon composite parts. That responsibility
also carried an obligation to assess the need for protection of civil aircraft from free
carbon fiber. An additional charter for NASA was to take part in, and coordinate, a pro-
gram of research and development of modified or alternate composite materials which would
be harmless from the standpoint of electrical hazards, yet which would satisfy the require-
ments of advanced composites for aircraft structures. While the R and D program for al-
ternative materials was assigned to all of NASA's research centers, the task of assessing
the possible hazards from the use of carbon fibers was assigned to NASA's Langley Research
Center.
A Graphite Fiber Risk Analysis Program office was formed at Langley to conduct the
risk analysis. The scenario that was adopted as being of interest for the accidental re-
lease of carbon or graphite fibers from civil aircraft is illustrated in Figure 5. This
scenario was hypothesized to encompass the consequences of accidents involving civil trans-
port aircraft, usually near major airports, where the efflux from the burning of composite-
carrying aircraft has the opportunity to be distributed downwind and thus to contaminate
not only the nearby airport environs but also numerous distant facilities as pictured in
the illustration. Another dimension of the risk analysis is afforded by the risk analy-
sis flow chart, shown in Figure 6, which includes all of the elements of importance which
can lead to damages from the release of conductive carbon fibers. Inasmuch as NASA's
risk analysis was organized and conducted according to the elements in the flow chart,
this paper will be presented in the same manner.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Sources of Released Carbon Fibers
The Graphite Fiber Risk Analysis scenario assumed carbon fibers to originate princi-
pally from fires from crashed commercial aircraft with carbon composite parts, as repre-
sented in Figure 7. However, non-crash events such as in-flight or ramp fires were also
considered. At the start of this program, there had been no known crashes of commercial
aircraft with any carbon composites in their structures. In the absence of actual ex-
perience, an investigation of ways to simulate the conditions of commercial aircraft
crash fires was deemed essential in order to predict the quantities and forms of carbon
fiber residues which might be released.
The earliest experiments in release of carbon fibers from burned composites classi-
fied the principal types of fiber residues as shown in Figure 8(9). Single fibers had
the potential for the greatest range of distribution due to their very slow settling rate,
while the clustering together of a number of single fibers gave a form of efflux which
would fall much faster than individual fibers. A third class of residue consisted of yet
faster settling strips of fibers, generally resulting from a single ply of a crossplied
composite, with the fibers being bound together either by incompletely burned resin or
the char formed by the burned resin. A fourth broad class of fibrous residue was frag-
ments of the composite, widely varied in size and shape. These fragments, which were
so dense that they were rarely found beyond the immediate vicinity of the fire, generally
resulted only from a substantial impact to the burning or burned composite. Rarely were
they formed as the result of a simple fire.
The emphasis of this carbon fiber source study was placed on the generation of single
carbon fibers from fire tests. First of all, the spread of single fibers was considered
to be the most extensive due to their buoyancy, and damage to electrical and electronic
equipment spread over a broad area of population was felt to pose the greatest possible
3economic loss. And secondly, single fibers were considered to be the form of residue
which would be most capable of penetrating the filters and cases of equipment to reach
the vital interiors. Accordingly, most of the fiber release data was gathered and uti-
lized as the percentage of single fibers released (over one millimeter in length) based
on the mass of carbon fiber initially present in the composite test specimens. The ini-
tial experiments which defined the broad classes of residues involved the destruction of
the burned composites with explosives (i0). Obviously, such a procedure lacked credibil-
ity for representing the typical commercial aircraft crashes. Furthermore, although the
fire plus explosive test showed substantial amounts of the highly buoyant single fibers
being released, there was an uncertainty as to both the amounts and the forms of residues
which might be generated from the simulated burning of composite aircraft parts without
the explosion step.
The testing program was conducted at six locations on contract to NASA-Langley. The
majority of the small scale composite burn tests were carried out at the U. S. Navy's
Dahlgren (VA) fire test facility, which was a completely enclosed environmental chamber,
approximately i00 square meters in area, in which small samples (up to 0.i square meter
in size) were burned with a propane gas burner and a variety of disturbing effects were
applied to the fibrous residue after consumption of the matrix resin. The test samples
were generally either flat composite plates or small specimens cut from prototype compos-
ite aircraft structural components. The principal advantage of this test facility was
the complete containment of all the fibers released, which were collected by allowing
them to settle onto highly adhesive deposition papers laid out on the floor of the cham-
ber. The fiber output from the tests was then counted, generally by optical microscopic
methods, in order to analyze the test results. Additional small scale test support was
provided by the AVCO Corporation's fire test facility in Lowell, MA (ii) and a NASA-Ames/
Scientific Services, Inc. test facility at Redwood City, California (12).
In addition to the small-scale laboratory test, valuable fiber release information
was acquired from outdoor composite burn tests conducted by TRW Inc., Redondo Beach,
California under U. S. Air Force sponsorship (13), for the purpose of studying not only
the nature of fiber release from burning composites, but also to verify predicted dissemi
nation patterns over broad areas. Confirmation of small-scale test data was also obtained
from large-scale demonstration testing conducted in the U. S. Navy's Dahlgren, VA tube
test facility and at the U. S. Army's Dugway (UT) Proving Ground.
Laboratory testing addressed the effects of the following variables on the amounts
and characteristics of carbon fibers from burned composites:
Type of fire fuel (jet fuel, propane, natural gas)
Nature of fire (fuel-rich, fuel-poor)
Duration of fire
Disturbances to residue during and after fire
Composite thickness and configuration (crossply, woven, unidirectional, etc.)
Composite surface and edge effects
Types of composite materials (fibers and resins)
Composite quality
The most important findings of the fiber release investigation were:
i. The type and degree of disturbance to the burning composite or burned fibrous
residue is the most critical variable for fiber release, as summarized in Figure 9. The
quiescent burning of composites leads to the least amounts of single fibers being re-
leased, almost invariably less than 0.1% of the initial mass of fiber present. Internal
disturbances to the fire residue, such as the type of flexing, twisting, vibrating, or
dropping which could be expected in a burning crashed airplane also released relatively
minor amounts of single fibers. While disruption of the fibrous residue applied as a
mechanical impact gives off many large fragments but less than one-quarter percent as
single fiber, the natural airflow of fires due to wind or fire-induced air currents re-
sulted in amounts of up to 1% single fiber. Although ordnance-type explosives appeared
to generate the greatest amounts of single fibers, near sonic airflows up to 250 meters
per second, which could simulate the explosion of fuel tanks, released amounts of single
carbon fibers almost as great.
2. Fire-generated single fibers were, in general, much shorter than expected. Most
_' tests, both burn and burn plus disturbance, gave fiber length spectra where the great
majority (two-thirds or more) were less than one millimeter in length. That length was
considered to be the lower limit for fibers of concern from the standpoint of vulner-
ability of electrical equipment. For those fibers over one millimeter in length, the
great majority ranged from one to four millimeters in length, with the observed mean
length being between two and three millimeters. Seldom were fibers over ten millimeters
long obtained.
3. Despite the oft-quoted indestructibility of graphite fiber, substantial masses
of carbon fibers from composite aircraft parts were consumed in representative fuel fires
considered to be typical of jet aircraft crash fires. This reflects the fact that the
carbon/graphite fibers in use today are not graphite to any great extent. However, fu-
ture use of the more graphitic, high modulus type would undoubtedly lead to less consump-
tion of fibers in fires. The mass loss which was observed was manifested by a reduction
in the thickness of the fibers, but there was probably some complete consumption of fibers
when released in the hotter regions of the fire as well as from the burning composite
itself.
4A major objective of the investigation of the sources of accidentally released fibers
was to guide the risk analysis efforts with reliable numbers on the predicted accidental
fire-release of fibers. After a thorough analysis of carbon fiber release test results,
the following criteria were assigned for use in the risk analyses. For those 85% of air-
craft crash fires which accident records disclosed had no explosions, a figure of 1% of
the mass of the carbon fibers initially present in those composites burned by the fire
was considered to be released as single fibers. For the 15% of crash fires with accom-
panying explosions, a figure of 3-1/2% single fiber released was used. The fibers re-
leased were further defined as having an exponential distribution with a mean length of
2 millimeters for all the lengths, above and below 1 millimeter, resulting in a total of
5 x 109 fibers released per kilogram of carbon fiber. (Actually, the distribution was
non-exponential for fibers less than one millimeter in length, which were of little con-
cern from an electrical standpoint, due to the high mean exposures to failure for such
short fibers).
Fiber Dissemination
The second of the risk analysis elements is the dissemination, or spread, of the
carbon fiber, once it has been released from a burning composite into the environment.
Before addressing the subject of dissemination, an explanation of the terms which describe
the measure of fiber pollution of the environment is in order (Figure i0). The concen-
tration C of carbon fibers is the number of fibers per cubic meter. Of even greater im-
portance from the standpoint of carbon fiber pollution,is the exposure E, which is the
concentration times the period of time during which the concentration endures, or the
time integral of the concentration. In some cases, the number of fibers that get depos-
ited on the ground, or on some other surface, is a useful measure of pollution. This
measure is the deposition D, the number of fibers deposited onto a unit area of surface.
Vulnerability of electrical equipment is usually expressed in terms of exposure, as the
time consequence of concentration.
The three main parameters which control the dissemination patterns for carbon fibers
are the fire, the nature of source of the fibrous materials, and the weather. The fire
begins the dissemination problem and it is influenced by such factors as the fire pool
size, the amount of fuel, and the burning rate. The source has a great deal to do with
the fiber exposure levels, since the source determines how many fibers can be given off,
what lengths they are, and what other forms of fibrous debris are released. And of
course the weather strongly controls the path and fate of the fibers, since it can de-
termine the height to which the fiber-laden fire plume can rise, how much mixing and di-
lution of the fire plume can occur, the direction taken by the fall-out, and the settling
of the fibers with precipitation such as rain and snow. Much dissemination research has
been conducted over the past thirty years or so, including the dissemination of nuclear
fall-out and the spread of aerosol pollutants into the environment. Existing Gaussian
models for the dissemination of fire effluents, such as the Trethewey-Kramer (14) and
EPA-Turner (15) models, were found to be acceptable for the carbon fiber risk analysis.
The Gaussian models (Figure ii) provide for dispersion of the cloud in a conical sector
downwind from the fire plume, with reflections from both the inversion layer and the
ground. The dispersion coefficient, that is, the angles at which the cloud spreads, have
been empirically determined for the various Pasquill-Gifford stability classes, ranging
from a 10 ° cone for stable weather to a 40 ° cone for unstable weather.
The fiber materials released from a fire form a cloud which moves with the velocity
of the wind and in the same direction as the wind. At a short distance from the fire,
the effects of diffusion create Gaussian distributions in the concentrations of fibers
along the direction of travel and across the spread of the cloud. The rate of spreading
and also the maximum altitude of the fibers within the cloud are determined by the weath-
er conditions. The ground level exposure can be described by a series of contours or
"footprints" which link points of equal exposures to either single fibers or lint (clus-
ters of fiber). As Figure 12 shows, overcast or nighttime conditions generally produce
longer, narrower contours, with fall-out distances of up to 100 kilometers. Fall velocity
has a direct effect on distance, with the heavier lint falling out in proportionately
shorter distances. Conditions typical of sunny weather tend to give shorter but broader
contours.
The single fiber coverage has been plotted in Figure 13 for a number of quantities
of released carbon fibers and for a number of appropriate exposure levels. This exposure
analysis allows the rapid determination of just how large a geographical region would be
exposed to a certain exposure level of carbon fibers, as the result of the release of a
specific weight of single carbon fibers. For example, if 40 kilograms of single carbon
fibers with an exponential distribution and a mean length of 2 millimeters were released,
an area about the size of the suburb of a city (about 107 square meters) would be exposed
to 106 fiber-seconds per cubic meter. The fiber analYses represented in Figure 13 were
developed from dispersion models. They showed that a certain quantity of released carbon
fibers would be dispersed over a much broader area than had been estimated initially,
but the fiber concentrations would be proportionately lower. The quantity of fiber re-
leased in the worst case prediction of this risk analysis is shown by the dotted line.
Fiber exposure levels ranging from 105 to 108 fiber-seconds per cubic meter can be ex-
pected to result in some failures of electrical equipment. A more detailed discussion
of equipment failures will be given in a later section on Vulnerability.
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Some initial thoughts concerning the lifetime of carbon fibers and their possible
redissemination after being deposited on the earth's surface were rather uncertain and
ominous. Due to the chemical inertness of carbon/graphite fibers, it was easy to imag-
ine that the fiber would live forever and that following the initial dissemination and
deposition onto the ground, they would be available to be lofted by winds into the at-
mosphere where they could continue to wreak havoc on electrical equipment. And each suc-
cessive release of fiber would build up the pollution to a heavy concentration over huge
'_ areas. The subjects of carbon fiber lifetime and redissemination were investigated at
the U. S. Army's Dugway Proving Ground, and the findings (16) have helped to alleviate
those early fears.
'* The study involved the monitoring of free single carbon fibers which were spread
out from the site of previous tests during which a total of 33 kilograms of virgin car-
bon fibers had been deposited onto a high desert plateau region with silty clay soil
having about a 25% cover of small, high desert scrub vegetation. Fibers were collected
by vertical fall-out onto "sticky paper" deposition samplers and also in a horizontal
transport mode in mesh screen samplers located 2 feet above the ground. Sampling was
conducted for a 24-hour period every two weeks after the initial fiber release for sev-
eral months followed by less frequent sampling until three years had passed. The fibers
which were initially released ranged from 6 to 12 millimeters in length, with a mean
length of 8 millimeters.
The data shown in Figure 14 indicates a rapid decrease in the amount of resuspended
fiber collected on the vertical mesh screen samplers within a month following the first
sampling, after which the collection leveled out to a quantity of fibers numbering only
about 5% as many as were found in the initial sampling. A second finding of the surveil-
lance was the drastic change in lengths of the resuspended fiber (Figure 15), which de-
creased from over 9 millimeters mean length for the initial sampling to less than 1.5
millimeters for fibers collected after 3 years. Combining the decrease in numbers of
deposited fibers with their decrease in length leads to the conclusion that after three
years, the mass of carbon fibers which had been subjected to resuspension was very low
indeed. Examination of the terrain revealed that the fibers were either buried partial-
ly or completely in the soil, or entrapped at the ground level by the scrub vegetation.
The mechanism for the redissemination process is believed to involve wind-driven parti-
cles of soil impacting the entrapped fibers which, because of their inherent brittleness,
break off into shorter segments.
The current opinion, and that reflected in the risk analysis, is that redissemination
of previously released carbon fibers would be a very small contribution to the entire
amount. Certainly vegetated areas, such as grasslands, forests, and cultivated fields
would not release any significant amounts of entrapped fibers. The only surface which
can be enVisioned as leading to a significant amount of redissemination would be hardtop
surfaces typical of urban areas, such as paved streets and roads, roofs, parking lots,
etc. Even then, precipitation effects could soon wash the fibers from the surfaces, and
traffic on roads could also serve to grind many _f the fragile fibers into an electrically-
harmless powder. Of course, larger forms of carbon fiber debris, such as single-ply
strips of burned out carbon composites, which have been shown to be transportable in the
air for distances up to one mile from the fire site (13), may have to be cleaned from
roadways soon after deposition to prevent the generation of a fresh supply of single fi-
bers by the action of traffic.
Transfer Function
Transfer function is the element of the risk analysis dealing with the penetration
of fibers through an interface. As applied to the transport of carbon fibers, the trans-
fer function is the ratio of fibers which pass through an interface to those which en-
counter the interface. Examples of the interfaces which influence the carbon fiber risks
are doors or window screens, filters, and equipment cabinets. The phenomenon of particle
transport in air is well understood and a body of data employed for heating and air con-
ditioning purposes was available. In addition, both analytical and experimental studies
of the transfer of carbon fibers into buildings through filters, and into equipment boxes
were made during this program. Much filter efficiency information was also available
from the National Bureau of Standards for widely used types of filters. Typical results
of the experimental studies have been shown in Figure 16 (17). The filter factor was de-
termined for a number of different types of filters, such as ordinary household window
screen and furnace filters, when exposed to fibers of different lengths. The chart at
the right of the figure shows that in addition to the removal by window screen of many
of the fibers with a mean length of 2 millimeters, another moderating influence on the
potential for electrical damage is afforded by passage of the shorter fibers with a mean
length less than 1 millimeter. Carbon fibers so short were considered harmless to vir-
tually all electrical equipment, but that moderating effect was not included in the risk
analysis.
In general, intentional or natural filtration of carbon fibers contributes a tre-
mendous reduction in the concentration of fibers actually reaching the critical electri-
cal equipment, with respect to the concentrations which encounter the filter barriers.
While such a crude filter as window screen (Figure 16) removed nearly 90% of the 4 milli-
meter fibers, air conditioning systems for homes and factories give transfer functions
of 10 -3 to 10 -4 for standard filters. On the other hand, some factors involved in fil-
tration can partially nullify the benefits of filters. For example, filters must be
6properly mounted: even a small gap between the filter and its mounting can reduce the
filter efficiency by an order of magnitude or more. Air velocity can also have a sub-
stantial effect on the number of fibers passing a filter, with a ten-fold increase in
air velocity resulting in a similar increase in passage of fibers. Air filters (or water
separators which serve the s_me purpose) in transport aircraft have extremely small
transfer functions (_2 x i0-_). However, as much as three-quarters of the fiber which
approaches an open aircraft avionics bay door could pass into that compartment while the
plane is on the ground. Entry of carbon fibers could be prevented, in the event of a
nearby incident, simply by closing the door. Nevertheless, filtration and natural bar-
riers to the transmission of carbon fibers were shown to provide alleviating effects to
the electrical hazards of the fibers.
Vulnerability
The investigation of the elements dealing with the vulnerability, or susceptibility,
of electrical and electronic equipment to damage from carbon/graphite fibers was preceded,
perhaps, by the most speculation about the seriousness of the problem. While several in-
cidents of damage caused by virgin carbon fibers in or near carbon fiber manufacturing
operations were a matter of record at the onset of NASA's study, there was apparently
no known instance in which fibers previously incorporated into a composite had been re-
leased in an accidental fire and had subsequently caused adverse electrical effects.
Consequently, a number of unknowns regarding the non-virgin carbon fibers had to be
studied and their effects on damage potential analyzed.
The types of effects that were expected from exposure of equipment to fibers were
listed previously in Table I. The categorization shown is very gross, but serves to
point out those general regions which were of the most concern. In the low voltage and
low power region, a carbon fiber has the capability to maintain a high resistance short
without burning out. In that event, the equipment could malfunction although the com-
ponents incur no local damage. The region of _edium voltage and high power causes some
concern since the fiber acts as a trigger to potential arcing, and the arcing may be
sustained. The result can be blown fuses, stressed components and flashovers at insula-
tors. The third region of most concern is that of both high power and high voltage,
where carbon fibers (as is the case for many foreign materials) can lead to corona, and
initiate arcing severe enough to disrupt and to damage equipment catastrophically.
The electronic equipment failure model used to describe the vulnerability of elec-
tronic equipment to carbon fibers has been shown in Figure 17, where the probability (P)
of failure is: P = 1-exp [-E/El , where E is the mean exposure required to fail the
equipment during testing and E is the exposure endured by the equipment. At the E expo-
sure level, the probabil!ty of failure of a piece of equipment is 0.632, while at an ex-
posure of one-tenth the E, the probability is only .095, meaning about 9 or i0 pieces of
equipment of the same type would fail out of 100 exposed.
The NASA Vulnerability Test Program relied principally on two test methods to assess
the susceptibility of electrical and electronic equipment to carbon fibers. The simplest
technique involved the use of a fiber simulator. This simple device was developed to
simulate the electrical characteristics of a carbon fiber. If the electronics or the
equipment to be tested had a limited number of nodes, 50 or perhaps no more than 100,
it was possible to probe the equipment and so be able to tell if a carbon fiber (as rep-
resented by the fiber simulator) could cause the equipment to malfunction or fail. Rep-
resentative electric appliances which were tested in that manner have been listed in
Table II (18).
The most direct method to test electrical equipment for vulnerability to carbon fi-
bers involved direct exposure of the equipment in a controlled chamber. An example of
the several chambers used in this program is the one located at NASA's Langley Research
Center, pictured in Figure 18. The operations scheme involved placement of the test
article in the chamber, while a known quantity (monitored by fiber sensors) of carbon fi-
bers of a desired length were chopped from continuous fiber tow and aspirated into the
exposure chamber. The fibers were then kept in suspension until the test article mal-
functioned or failed, or until a maximum exposure level (usually 108 fiber-seconds per
cubic meter) was reached without failure. A number of replicate tests were conducted
for each test item, whether it failed or not. A thorough cleaning of the equipment,
such as by removal of fibers with a vacuum cleaner, was conducted between tests. A sum-
mary of the articles tested in the NASA or other chambers is presented in Table III (19).
Over 150 individual articles were tested for electrical/electronic susceptibility
to carbon fibers by the fiber simulator and test chamber methods. The results in Tables
II and III indicate that many pieces of equipment were invulnerable to carbon fibers.
Most household appliances with ll0-volt circuits proved to be unaffected. Enough pieces
of consumer equipment were selected to be representative of about 75% of the market value
of consumer goods. Very little 220-volt testing was done, but it was expected that 220-
volt single-phase circuitry would be about as resistant to carbon fibers as ll0-volt,
since 440-volt single phase equipment was also proven to be relatively unaffected. (How-
ever, arcs could be sustained for 440-volt, 60 hertz industrial power using three phase
transformer supplies capable of delivering currents in the range of 400 to 1500 amps,
when arcs were initiated. An idea of the exposures leading to failure of some equipment
can b_ seen from Figure 19 (19). Most equipment was vulnerable at 105-107 fiber-seconds
per m = for longer fibers, and near 108 fiber-seconds per m J for very short ones. No
equipment failed in the lower left hand region of the figure outlined by shading.
Figure 20 (19) illustrates an important factor influencing the effect of carbon fi-
bers on electrical circuits. The tests were conducted with three different fiber lengths:
short (_3 mm), medium (_7 mm), and long (_12 mm). It is apparent that the longer fibers
were much more effective in causing malfunctions than short ones. As was pointed out in
the section on Source, most fire-generated carbon fibers are very short, with mean lengths
usually between two and three millimeters. Therefore, the exposure levels causing equip-
ment failure are quite high for the fibers released in real-life situations.
Another important relationship which was established by fiber chamber tests was
that associated with the resistance of the carbon fibers themselves. Figure 21 (19)
shows the effect that the fiber resistance had upon the critical exposure levels for
three pieces of equipment. The stereo amplifier was an order of magnitude in exposure
less vulnerable to DE 114, a high resistance, low temperature-processed carbon fiber,
than it was to the T300 fiber in common use today. Similarly, a color television set
and an air traffic control transponder were from 1-1/2 to 2 orders of magnitude of ex-
posure less vulnerable to failure from T300 fiber than they were to two highly conduc-
tive, very high modulus fibers GY70 and HMS. Studies also concluded that fibers re-
leased from composites by fire had resistivities unchanged from virgin fibers and the
damage potential of such fibers was the same as for the raw fibers. Another concern was
that of post-exposure vulnerability. Most of the testing of equipment in Table III was
done in the "on" condition. There was some concern about whether or not equipment which
was exposed while "off" would fail subsequent to turning it "on". A test scheme involv-
ing 200 hours of testing of a color television set and a stereo amplifier, including many
"on-off" cycles, indicated that post-exposure failure was not a significant problem.
As pointed out in the Introduction, one of NASA's responsibilities in the conduct
of its carbon fiber risk analysis was to assess the need for protection of civil air-
craft from released carbon fiber as warranted by the vulnerability of those aircraft to
carbon fibers. A detailed analysis of the civil transport aircraft built by three do-
mestic U. S. manufacturers was carried out. The analysis included testing of several
specific types of avionics equipment typically used in those aircraft and having some
expectancy, for various reasons, of being susceptible to damage from carbon fibers.
Five pieces of avionics were tested extensively in the Langley test chamber (20): an
air traffic control (ATC) transponder, an instrument landing system (ILS) receiver,
a very high frequency (VHF) transceiver, distance measuring equipment (DME), and a
flight director system. Except for the DME, none of the equipment was conformally coat-
ed. The equipment was exposed to fibers with three lengths: i, 3, and 10 millimeters.
All of the values for E (mean exposure to failure) were above 4 x i0 U fiber-seconds per
cubic meter, with the ATC transponder having the lowest value. That represented the
oldest electronic design for a piece of equipment tested; it was introduced in the 1960's.
It had the greatest open area available for ingesting fibers, with two sides of the dust
cover completely perforated with 3.18 millimeter (i/8 inch) holes. Because of the gap
sizes in the equipment and the filtering action of the dust covers, 3 millimeter fibers
were the most significant in terms of contamination. As a result of detailed analysis
based not only on the fiber exposure tests, but also on internal airflow analysis for
the aircraft and various operational duty states of the aircraft, it was concluded that
ground-exposed aircraft at an airport with a carbon composite crash fire would experience
a much lower avionics equipment failure rate from carbon fibers than current normal op-
erational failures. Because of the redundancy required for the current operational fail-
ure rate, no further protection for civil aircraft avionics was anticipated to be re-
quired.
A final concern in the area of vulnerability was that of carbon fiber-induced shock
hazards. Under NASA sponsorship, the National Bureau of Standards examined a large num-
ber of household equipment items for susceptibility to failure and/or shock hazard. As
mentioned before, ll0-volt household appliances were generally invulnerable to carbon
fibers. However, at extreme exposure levels some appliances were susceptible to carbon-
fiber induced shorts to the external appliance case where potential shock hazard can
exist. The most susceptible equipment for the shock potential was found to be the com-
mon household toaster (21). An analysis based on the projected carbon fiber usage and
accident rates in 1993 (the year for which the risk analysis was performed), indicated
less than one potential shock hazard per year would be caused by accidental carbon fiber
release. Furthermore, it was predicted that the short current would not be lethal since
the fiber would burn out (that is, using the 30 million psi modulus fibers in use in
1980).
Demonstration Testing
A series of tests were conducted (22) in a large, tubular fire facility to demon-
strate an agreement between the susceptibility of electronic equipment to carbon fibers
generated from burning composites in a jet fuel fire and the vulnerability of the same
equipment to clean, virgin fibers in the Langley exposure chamber. The unique fire
chamber was a modification of a portion of a long, shock tube located at the Naval Sur-
face Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. A photograph of the 750-meter long tube is
pictured in Figure 22. A 275-meter section of the tube was utilized, with a 1.22-meter
square commercial jet A fuel fire being burned at a location where the tube was 4,6
meters in diameter. Composite specimens were burned in the fire and the fire plume was
pulled through the last 275 meters of the tube by up to six large fans. A water fog
spraying down from the top of the tube served to remove carbon fibers from the smoke
plume, which exited from the 7.3-meter (24-foot) diameter end of the tube. During the
equipment exposure tests, six identical fan-cooled, unfiltered stereo amplifiers were
situated on a target table at 220 meters (700 feet) from the fire. The amplifiers were
8in an operating mode during the fiber release fire test. Strips of carbon fiber/epoxy
composites were placed in a wire mesh basket, which was rotated in the middle of the fire
during the entire period of the test. The actual failure of the amplifiers have been
represented in Figure 23 by the step-wise solid line plot. The first four amplifiers
had failed after the first 600 seconds of the t_st. Those failures have been indicated
by the step-up at an exposure of about 6.5 x 10 fiber-seconds per cubic meter, with a
fifth failure occurring when an exposure of 2.4 x 106 fiber-seconds _er meter 3 had been
reached, and the final amplifier failed at a level of about 3.3 x i0 fiber-seconds per
meter 3. The experimental failures in the shock tube test matched very well the failures
predicted from the Langley chamber-derived exponential probability curve superimposed on
the figure.
A series of large scale outdoor demonstration tests was conducted at the U. S. Army's
Dugway Proving Ground in Utah (23). The series consisted of two types of tests: source
tests designed to measure the extent of fiber release from burning carbon/epoxy compos-
ites in a large JP-4 fuel fire and plume tests which were intended to not only capture
carbon fibers and so determine the amounts released, but also to disseminate the released
fibers over an area so large as to realistically simulate the dispersion expected from
the crash and burning of a commercial air transport with carbon composite parts. The
tests were carried out using a 10.7-meter diameter fuel pool size and 11.4 cubic meters
of JP-4 aviation fuel. Duration of the fires was nominally 1200 seconds. About 45 ki-
logram quantities of real and test aircraft parts of carbon/epoxy composites were placed
on an elevated steel mesh table above the fire pool.
The source tests were conducted during periods of very low wind speeds (less than
0.4 meters per second) in order to allow the fire plume to rise vertically from the fire.
A large number of steel mesh sampling devices which captured released carbon fibers on
the mesh screen within a cannister were suspended in an array above the fire. The sam-
plers were suspended from cables rigged from four 60-meter high towers, arranged in a
65-meter square around the fire pool.
The dissemination tests were conducted in the same manner except that wind speeds
from 2.7 to 5.4 meters per second were desired, and a wind direction of 320 ° i 35 ° was
required. This permitted the fire plume to pass through a huge "jacobs ladder" (Figure
24). (The 169-meter high Washington Monument has been shown to scope the size of the
undertaking). This "jacobs ladder" was constructed from 2.54 mm Kevlar Q rope with
horizontal and vertical spacings of 15.25 meters. The 305-meter by 305-meter network
was suspended from a catenary which was lofted by two U. S. Air Force 1270 m 3 balloons,
with stabilizing tether lines placed out in all directions. The net was placed 153
meters from the fire. Many sampling devices of several types were mounted on the net.
These included flat plastic rectangular frames, with their 0.29 m x 0.23 m openings
covered with 1 mm mesh fabric coated with a sticky substance to cause fibers to adhere
to the mesh when the samplers were placed at the intersections of the rope, normal to
the flow of the smoke plume. Other samplers included mesh filters in cardboard cannis-
ters similar to the steel samplers suspended over the fire, eight high voltage electri-
fied grids instrumented to discharge when contacted by fibers, open-ended 0.085 meter
diameter cans with adhesive-coated fabric mesh spread over one of the open ends, fiber
collection pumps and filters used to monitor the air for excessive concentrations of
respirable-sized fibers, and light emitting diode detection devices. As the fire plume
passed through the suspended "jacob's ladder", the fibers were detected or collected by
the array of monitoring apparatus which was then analyzed subsequent to the test. In
addition, the dissemination of fibers was monitored by means of both deposition sticky
papers and vertically mounted open-ended mesh can samplers spread out at appropriate in-
tervals for distances of up to 19 kilometers from the fire in the direction of the wind
flow.
A summary of the results of both the source and the dissemination tests has been
presented in Table IV. Variance from the laboratory tests reported in the Source sec-
tion of this report was noted only for the average fiber lengths. The average lengths
of 5.0, 4.4 and 5.2 millimeters from the three dissemination tests were somewhat higher
than the lengths obtained for the laboratory tests. However, the average length (3.2
mm) from the source test was in keeping with the laboratory test findings. The average
fiber diameters of 4.1 to 4.7 micrometers indicated a substantial oxidation of the fi-
bers from their normal 6 to 8 micrometers in the virgin state. The weight percent of
fiber release was in concert with many of the laboratory results.
Conclusions pertinent to the risk analysis, based on the results of the large scale
demonstration tests at Dahlgren and Dugway Proving Ground, are summarized below.
A maximum of 0.5% of carbon fiber, based on the amount initially present in the
composite specimens exposed to the fire, was released in the best Dahlgren shock tube
fire and equipment exposure test. However, since that was a long duration fire (over
12,000 seconds) and the fiber release was forced, the maximum of 0.19% released from
the Dugway demonstration tests was considered more representative of predicted fiber re-
lease from commercial air transport fires. Therefore, the figure of 1% carbon fiber re-
lease used in the risk calculations was quite conservative. The mean fiber length (2
mm) from the Dahlgren test was in close agreement with the value used in the risk analy-
sis, but some of the mean lengths from the Dugway large scale tests were somewhat longer
than the mean length used for the risk analysis. And finally, the Dahlgren demonstration
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9tests established that the vulnerability of equipment to fire-released fibers agrees with
the vulnerability of the equipment to virgin, unburned carbon fibers, thus justifying
the use of fiber chamber test data in the risk calculations.
Facility Surveys
Surveys of 62 public, utility, commercial and industrial installations in the United
States were conducted (24) in order to develop a sound foundation for the use of census
data generated in the analysis of the overall risk to the community from the use of car-
bon fibers in civilian aviation. A summary of the number and types of installations of
the four major classes has been summarized in Table V. Emphasis was placed on three
main elements:
(a) Determination of data for use in modeling the economic impact of fiber-induced
failures;
(b) Identification of the sensitivity of life-critical or emergency services to the
fiber hazard; and,
(c) Definition of the sensitivity of in-place equipment to airborne fibers.
Analysis of the results of the surveys indicated that life-critical services already
have sufficient in-place protection for isolation from the environment so that further
protection against airborne carbon fibers was not required. For example, hospital op-
erating rooms and critical care areas use such "absolute" levels of air filtration to
guard against airborne infections and contaminations that fibers would not enter those
areas. Another finding was that more than half of the 21 industrial installations sur-
veyed had strong in-place barriers against the ingestion of airborne carbon fibers, such
as high efficiency filters or coated circuitboards, due to the needs to protect against
atmospheric or self-generated contaminants. Assembly lines and other continuous process
type operations represent cases where operations could be halted by on-line equipment
failures. Quite generally, such operations have preventative or protective in-place
measures adequate to resist carbon fiber damage. And finally, many industrial installa-
tions have the ability to shift operations or to work around failures in equipment.
Where equipment failures caused by other adverse factors are the rule, quickly installed
parts are kept in readiness.
Conclusions which resulted from a comprehensive analysis of the survey were, as fol-
lows:
o Life critical functions could be excluded from any impact on the risk analysis.
o Emergency services would suffer no interruption. Any economic impact would be
limited to specific items of equipment.
o Utilities would suffer no system loss. The economic impact would be confined to
local outages and repairs.
o Commercial institutions, such as banks, stores, etc., would incur no interruptions
to critical operations. Any adverse impact from carbon fibers would be limited to pe-
ripheral equipment.
o Industrial operations: A number of class operations, such as food processors,
textile mills, paper mills, printing, chemicals, and others, representing 40% of the
national value-of-shipments, would create no adverse impact on the risk analysis because
of protection from their present operating environment. Another group (machinery, some
transportation comprising 15% national value-of-shipments would contribute no impact on
the carbon fiber risk because their operations require local protection from cutting
fluids and contaminants. Other installations representing 10% of value-of-shipments,
such as electrical and instrument plants, would create minimal impact on the risk due
to their critical need for air conditioning or other control of ambient conditions. And
a fourth group of industrial installations, comprising plants having 7% of the national
value-of-shipments from their operations, would also contribute a minimal risk impact
because their operations are supported by ready spares.
Risk Computations
The primary objective of the risk analysis was to estimate the risk to the nation
over the next 15 years (from 1978) resulting from the use of carbon composites in civil
aircraft. A secondary purpose was to provide a framework for decision making on com-
posite material usage, material modification, and protection schemes. Two contractors,
ORI and Arthur D. Little, Inc. were selected to develop independently methods to numer-
ically evaluate the potential losses due to failures of electrical equipment from air-
borne carbon fiber contamination originating from civilian aircraft crashes. The risk
computations were conducted in two phases. ORI developed a risk model based on the 9
largest hub airports in Phase I (25) and proceeded to translate the risk profiles for a
number of individual airports into a national model in Phase II (26). Arthur D. Little,
Inc. developed a preliminary national profile from 26 major airports in the first phase
(27) and followed up with a number of refinements to the national risk profile in Phase
II (28).
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The available commercial air transport accident records of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) were augmented by information from the three major U. S. air-
frame manufacturers. They supplied detailed data on accident characteristics, such as
fire duration and severity of damage to aircraft, that would affect carbon fiber release
conditions. Projections on the extent of carbon fiber usage • on U. S. commercial air-
craft were also generated by the aircraft manufacturers. Such projections included the
numbers of planes expected to be in service in 1993, by three types: small, medium, and
large jets, as well as the ranges of quantities of carbon fiber composites which were
predicted to be used on those planes. Among the criteria for determining the aircraft
crashscenarios were the operational phases during which the accidents occurred. Figure
25 Summarizes NTSB data for 1968-1976 (29) indicating that almost half of the severe ac-
cidents accompanied by fire occurred during landing, while a quarter of the accidents
with fire occurred during takeoff. Furthermore, 60% of the accidents happened at the
airport and 80% were within 10 kilometers of airports. Attention was also focused on
26 large hub airports which accounted for nearly 70% of U. S. emplanements. And lastly,
3.8 severe fire accidents were predicted annually in the United States. Based on pre-
dictions that 70% of the jet fleet would be using carbon composite parts by 1993, 2.7
fire accidents per year were projected for 1993 for such aircraft.
Figure 26 (27) shows the sequence of events which were modeled in order to describe
the carbon fiber risk phenomenon. The simplified event tree logic which was followed to
arrive at the local risk profile has been depicted in three sequential figures, Figures
27a, 27b, 27c (30). Random selections are used during many phases of this event tree for
selecting the paths. At various points, the random selection leads to inputs from var-
ious elements of the entire program. For example, if an accident is randomly selected
(Figure 27b) which involved an explosion in addition to a fire, then 3-1/2% single fiber
release will be used. If the accident chosen involved fire only, then 1% single fiber
release was used in the model of that accident. When the. path of the event tree reaches
Figure 27c, the areas of the city and/or countryside affected have been defined. Input
from the elements of transfer function, vulnerability, and facility surveys then permit
the determination of cost impacts from the accident. Examples of costs are repair or
replacement of equipment, downtime, product losses, etc. Using a selected historical
number of accidents each year (%3 to 6), the random selection of nodes in the event tree
and the cost calculations are repeated for each accident and the cost is summed to obtain
one estimate of the national cost. One estimate, however, is insufficient to obtain a
statistical distribution of estimates, so the national risk calculations must be repeated
a large number of times.
The results of the annual risk profiles for economic losses due to 'commercial air
transport fires involving carbon fibers have been given in Figure 28. The Phase I pro-
file was assessed one year earlier than those from Phase II. The markedly lower risks
in Phase II were attributable to a number of refinements in single fiber release (5%
fire, 25% fire-explosion in Phase I vs. 1% fire, 3-1/2% fire-explosion in Phase II), a
ten-fold decrease in infiltration due to use of experimental transfer function data¢ and
extreme diminishments in equipment susceptibility due to shorter fiber lengths and
higher mean exposures to failure. An increase in predicted carbon fiber usage in air-
craft manufacturing made a slight positive contribution to the risk profile.
As the risk profiles in Figure 28 show, the expected annual risks to the United
States due to the predicted use of carbon composites on civil aircraft in 1993 are cer-
tainly less than $i000 per year. The chances of national losses reaching significant
levels are extremely small. For example, both the ORI and Arthur D. Little (ADL) models
indicate (at the crossover for the plots) that an accident resulting in $5000 damage
from carbon fibers would only occur every 40 years_ Although a trend toward significant
use of carbon fiber composites on general aviation aircraft has not yet emerged, separate
risk computations dealing with forecasts of up to 55 kilograms of such composite per
plane were made. The conclusion from that study was that it was extremely unlikely
there would be a substantial dollar loss due to carbon fiber releases in general avia-
tion accidents. Further diminishing the concern for carbon fiber hazards is the fact
that loss of life from carbon fiber electrical events is virtually non-existent.
Material Modification
As pointed out in the Introduction, a secondary responsibility assigned to NASA
under the Federal Action Plan was to investigate alternative or modified composite ma-
terials which would lessen or eliminate electrical hazards as a consequence of the use
of composites. This responsibility was assigned to NASA's research centers since new
materials research and development fit into the existing charters of the centers' base
technology programs. All of the installations (Langley, Ames, and Lewis Research Cen-
ters, Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory) had knowledgeable
line organizations with composite materials expertise so that a minimal impact on their
existing research programs resulted.
The general objective of the resulting program was to develop composites which re-
duce carbon fiber electrical risks while retaining or improving the structural proper-
ties of resin matrix composites which make them desirable for use in aircraft struc-
tures. A NASA workshop on modified and alternate materials was held at Langley Re-
search Center (31) in March 1978 as a means of making the composite materials community
aware of the carbon fiber hazards program and to solicit the ideas of government, in-
dustrial and academic representatives. The cooperative efforts of the workshop resulted
in a program with the following elements:
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Test Methods
Hybrid Composites
Fiber Gasification
Modified Epoxy Resins
Fiber Coatings
Alternate Matrices
High Resistance Fibers
New Fibers
The element of test methods was given the highest priority since it was essential
that investigators be able not only to determine the effectiveness of their new or modi-
fied materials, but also be able to compare them with other modified materials. However,
since research could not be delayed pending the development of standardized test methods,
several different tests were developed for determining fiber release at several of the
research centers. One rather simple test device was developed at NASA's Ames Research
Center (32) and it was utilized to a limited extent for comparing the relative amounts
of single fibers which were released from burning composites. The device burned rela-
tively small composite specimens, approximately 25-30 cm 2 in size, with a heat flux
fairly realistic for a fuel fire, after which the composite was impacted with a pneumat-
ically driven steel ball. The released fibers could then be collected and measured.
The concept of hybrid composites to minimize the release of conductive fibers was
considered to be the most promising approach by the workshop participants. The hope that
outer, or alternating, plies of a nonburning fiber reinforcement used together with plies
of carbon fiber would help contain free carbon fibers appeared to be valid in preliminary
tests, especially for composites which were just burned without any severe disturbance.
Although the concept has not been evaluated conclusively, there are indications (33)
that the type of disruption applied to the residual post-burned fibrous mass may De crit-
ical in determining the validity of the hybrid concept.
Fiber gasification was a novel approach which involved the deposition onto carbon
fibers of certain metallic ions which would catalyze the complete consumption of the
fibers when exposed to flame. Preliminary results (34) with such contaminants as cal-
cium and barium acetates were promising, although much additional research was required
to prove the practicality of this potential solution to the problem.
The modification of the epoxy resins used in composites was attractive from the
standpoint of promising a minimum disruption of current applications and the least re-
qualification of the modified composites. It was early recognized in the determination
of fiber release from carbon-epoxy composites that epoxies are always converted in fires
to a small amount of char which serves to bind individual carbon fibers together, thus
preventing their release for some time. Some promising modified epoxies were uncovered
by changing the chemistry, catalysts, and blending to give much higher char yields (35).
The same thrust toward higher char yield resins was the basis for much of the attention
paid to another element in the program, that of alternate matrices.
The general objective of the fiber coatings element of the program was to deposit
coatings onto existing carbon fibers and thus to render them nonconducting. Among sev-
eral coating materials such as silicones, boron nitride, silicates, boron carbide and
silicon carbide (36), (37) the latter offered the most promise. A ten-fold increase in
resistance of carbon fibers was afforded by a 0.i micrometer coating, but oxidation of
the silicon carbide to silicon dioxide at 1273 K gave six orders of magnitude increase
in resistance. However, preliminary tests indicated some undesirable effects on the
properties of composites made from the coated fibers.
The last two elements of the materials modification program, nonconductive fibers
and new fibers, were considered to be the most long-term in nature and, thus, were rel-
atively low in priority. When the carbon fibers were oxidized to carbon oxide fibers,
the resistivities of the resulting fibers were much higher (up to 105 ohm/cm) . However,
the degradation of fiber properties was excessive. As a nonconductive fiber with me-
chanical properties quite similar to carbon, boron nitride fibers were being studied
prior to the emergence of carbon fiber electrical hazards and those early efforts were
revived and augmented as a result of this new program. At least one high modulus, non-
conductive organic fiber was studied as a hoped-for replacement for carbon fibers.
The materials modification program was undertaken with the full knowledge that the
chances of replacing, improving, or even modifying, an existing industrial product such
as carbon fiber which had undergone years of industrial development were very remote.
It is not possible to claim any positive results from this program at the present time
since the program has been underway for less than two years, and some of the leads are
still being actively pursued. The findings of extremely low risks as a result of the
afore-described carbon fiber risk analysis has certainly diminished the necessity for
new materials research. Nevertheless, the incentive which engendered the modified
materials research program could well prove to have been the driving force instrumental
in the successful development of one or more exciting new composite materials in the
future.
Concluding Remarks
A comprehensive assessment of the possible damage to electrical equipment caused
by accidental release of carbon fibers from burning civil aircraft with composite parts
has been completed. The study concluded that the amounts of fiber expected to be re-
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leased were lower than initially supposed: conservative quantities of 1% and 3-1/2%
were employed in the risk computations for aircraft crash fires and crash fires plus
explosions, respectively. Footprints of carbon fibers determined from dispersion models
were found to be much larger in area than originally estimated, but were much lower in
fiber concentrations. Redissemination, as a source for fiber, was shown to be insignif-
icant. The susceptibility of electrical equipment to carbon fibers was low for current
structural fibers. Consumer appliances, industrial electronics, and aviation instrumen-
tation were relatively invulnerable to carbon fibers. The overall risk costs were shown
to be extremely low: the expected annual cost was less than $i000 and it was predicted
that there was only one chance in two thousand of exceeding $150,000 equipment loss in
1993. Furthermore, the potential shock hazard from carbon fibers was insignificant, so
risk of life from electrical fiber effects was not considered to be a factor in the
overall risk associated with the widespread use of carbon fiber composites in commercial
aircraft structures.
The results of the NASA risk assessment program are such that the electrical effects
of carbon fibers should not be considered an impediment to further development of carbon
composites in aircraft use. In addition, a program to develop alternate materials spe-
cifically to overcome that perceived hazard is not necessary.
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TABLE I.-TYPICAL ELECTRICAL EFFECTS FROM CARBON FIBERS
Voltage Range Low Power (Up to 100W) High Power (Above 100W)
Low
(0 to 30 Volts) Sustained shorts Sustained shorts
Fiber not burned Fiber not burned
Malfunctions No equipment damage
No local damage
Medium
(30 to 1000 Volts) Sparking or shorts Some sustained arcs
Possible fiber burn Fiber burns
Transients Transients
Blown fuses Blown fuses
Stressed components Stressed components
Low damage potential Damage usually
repairable
High
(>i000 Volts) Sparks, no sustained arcs Sustained arcs
Low voltage corona Corona
Transients Flashover
Interruptions May be severe damage
TABLE II.-APPLIANCES TESTED WITH FIBER SIMULATOR
With No Significant Failures*
• Refrigerators • Fry pans
• Freezers • Bed covers
• Ranges • Coffee makers
• Dishwashers • Percolators
• Clotheswasher • Food mixers
• Clothes dryer • Can openers
• Vacuum cleaners • Portable heaters
• Irons
With Failures
None
*Significant failures are those resulting in equipment damage or
loss of function.
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TABLE III.-EQUIPMENT TESTED IN FIBER TEST CHAMBER
With No Failures
• Telecommunicator • AM/FM Radio
• Black & white television • Home music system
• Air Surveillance Radar (ASR-3) • Clock radio
• Calculator • i0 Band radio
• Calculator and printer • Car radio
• Tape recorder • Toasters
• Electric motors (6) ii0 V. • Instrument Landing System receiver
• Thermostats (2) • Distance Measuring Equipment
• Cash registers • Smoke alarms
• Portable heater
With Failures
• Military equipment (70) • Connector blocks
(High modulus fibers,
restricted lengths) • Quick disconnects
• Computer • Relays
• Color television • Generic circuits
• Digital voltmeter • Power amplifier
• Air Traffic Control transponder • Microwave oven
• Very High Frequency transceiver
• Flight director
TEST IV.-SINGLE CARBON FIBERS RELEASED FROM DUGWAY OUTDOOR FIRE TESTS
Carbon Fiber Average Average Single Fibers
Test Mass in Fire, Total Number Length Diameter Released
k_ mm _m _ %
D-I 31.8 1.5 x 10 _ 5.0 4.7 50 0.16
D-2 31.8 2.1 x 108 4.4 4.4 62 .19
D-3 52.0 i.i x 108 5.2 4.1 38 .07
S-I 34.9 2.9 x 108 3.3 4.7 64 .18
S-2 31.8 2.2 x 108 3.2 4.6 47 .15
16
TABLE V.-SUMMARY OF FACILITIES SURVEYED
i) Public Support No. 3) Commercial Installations N__o.
Hospitals 7 Department stores 2
Air traffic controls 6 Financial institutions 2
Airports-Airlines 3 Radio and TV stations 6
Police headquarters 2 Analytical laboratories 1
Fire dispatch 2
Post offices 1 4) Manufacturing Operations
Traffic control 1 Meat packing 1
Textile mill 1
2) Utilities Garments 1
Telephone exchanges 3 Pulp and paper 1
Power generation and 3 Publishing 2
distribution Textile fibers 1
Refuse incinerators 2 Toiletries 1
AMTRAK Railway System 1 Steel mills 2
Wire, cable 1
Electrical equip. 6
Automotive fab/assy 4
/
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